Abstract: Marx's and Engels' commitment to democracy is often doubted. This article argues that support for democratic political processes was integral to the political tradition with which they identified themselves: broadly speaking, that of support for the French Revolution, and more specifically, for the kind of democratic communism advocated during the Revolution by Gracchus Babeuf and his followers. The Babeuvistes aimed primarily at the reinstitution of the democratic Constitution of 1793, and expected any future communist society to be run on wholly democratic lines; Marx and Engels held similar beliefs.
equality everywhere. They drove away by shoals noblemen, bishops, and abbots, and all those little princes that for so long had played in history the part of dolls. They effected a clearing, as if they were settlers advancing in the backwoods of the American Far West; the antediluvian forest of "ChristianGermanic" society disappeared before their victorious course, like clouds before the rising sun. 7 The most significant feature of French rule in Germany, as elsewhere, was the attack on the system of feudal laws and differential privileges belonging to the dominant classes in the German states. Yet only in the Rhineland was this attack judged a complete success. In an article of 1851 in the New York Daily Tribune, Engels described how the political and social structure of most of Germany just prior to the 1848 revolutions remained 'complicated': the feudal nobility 'retained a great portion of their ancient privileges'. Serfdom, the legal privileges of the nobility and clergy, and the vast church estates had been permanently abolished only on the left bank of the Rhine. 8 Moreover, the people of the Rhineland remained grateful to France for this. According to a private letter of 1836 from the president of the Rhine province to the Prussian interior minister, 'the immense majority of the inhabitants of this province who are interested in politics consider the social consequences of the French Revolution--the abolition of feudal rights and privileges of all sorts, the proclamation of the principle of the equality of all classes--to have been a huge benefit, and 5 7 ibid., pp.17, 19 8 Engels, 'Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany: 1. Germany at the Outbreak of the Revolution,' The New York Daily Tribune, October 25, 1851; MECW 11:5-13, 7, 11 look upon every act of government which would tend to the re-establishment of the former state of things with an infinite mistrust.' 9 If the impact of French rule was greater in the Rhineland than anywhere else on the continent, its impact in Trier, Marx's hometown, was greater than anywhere else in the Rhineland. Renamed Trèves, Trier had speedily been established as the capital of the French département of La Sarre, its centuries-old ecclesiastical government dismantled and an effective bureaucracy put in its place. Significantly for the Marx family, the arrival of the French also brought about the legal emancipation of Jews, as well as freedom of the press and other liberties; and judging by the number of pro-French literary and political associations that sprang up in the early years of French rule--the most eminent of which, the Casino Club, had included both Karl's father and headmaster among its founding members--Trier's citizens were quick to take advantage of these new freedoms. By 1814, as Marx's biographer David
McLellan remarks, the inhabitants of Trier had become so 'imbued' with 'a taste for freedom of speech and constitutional liberty uncharacteristic of the rest of Germany' that the transfer to Prussian rule provoked 'considerable dissent.' 10 Marx's family had special reason to be disappointed by the handover to Prussia.
Karl's father, Heinrich Marx, had until that point spent his entire professional career under the governance of the Code Napoléon, which had rendered his Jewishness effectively irrelevant (in that domain at least), notwithstanding the withdrawal of some of the original gains of emancipation under Napoleon's Decree of March 1808. Under Prussian law, however, Jews were not allowed to hold any position in the service of the state without 6 special royal dispensation, so Heinrich was obliged to convert to Christianity in order to continue in his post at Trier's Higher Court of Appeal.
Karl's exposure to the political effects of the Revolution went beyond his father's compromised position, however. As he grew up, almost every figure of moral authority in his life was engaged in an effort to reinstate at least some of the rights and reforms that had first been established as part of the Revolution, and then lost in the reaction against it.
This was particularly evident in the aftermath of the 1830 revolution in France. The toppling of a second Bourbon monarch from the French throne had acted, as Jacques Droz has written, as 'a sort of springboard which revived among the Rhinelanders the memory of the Revolution,' and this led to an increase in demands for political reform all over the region--and a concomitant crackdown by the Prussian authorities. 11 In 1832, Karl's own high school became the site of political confrontation when his headmaster, the Kant scholar Hugo Wyttenbach (also Karl's history teacher and a close family friend), was detained following his involvement in a demonstration in Hambach calling for a free press. Wyttenbach was put under police observation and the whole school searched, revealing copies of speeches made at the demonstration and various pieces of anti-government satire to be in the possession of pupils. For the time being Wyttenbach kept his position, but he was eventually forced to share it with a second, more conservative headmaster, Lörs, sent in to clamp down on the unorthodox goings-on at the school: a humiliating experience for Wyttenbach which distressed his friend Heinrich Marx and provided the occasion for an act of defiance on Karl's part when he neglected to pay Lörs the customary leave-taking visit upon graduating from high school in 1835. 12 A second example of the way in which the memory of the Revolution was kept alive in the Marx circle relates to an incident a couple of years later, when Karl was fifteen years old. The occasion was a banquet of 12 January, 1834, held as part of a series taking place across the German lands in support of more representative constitutions, and specifically to honour Trier's liberal deputies to the Rhenish Landtag at a time when many conservatives were calling for the abolition of the provincial assemblies. The banquet--the only one of its kind to be put on in Prussia--was organised and hosted by the Casino Club, and featured Heinrich Marx as its keynote speaker. According to the police spy who was present, it was a markedly 'French' affair, and included the performance of several 'revolutionary songs'. On its own this might not have prompted the police to take action, but when on the occasion of the anniversary of the Club's founding, the following week, some 'wine-emboldened' members paraded up and down with an old Tricolore, singing the Marseillaise, this triggered a police crackdown. 13 The ringleaders of the latter incident were tried for high treason and the entire membership was placed under surveillance. Heinrich Marx had maintained a respectful tone towards the king in his speech and nothing further came of his involvement, but both Karl's Hebrew and mathematics teachers, were arrested, accused of 'singing revolutionary songs,' and 'materialism and atheism' respectively. 14 A third point of contact between the young Marx and the Revolution was the political education he received at home, from both his father and his future father-in-law, the Baron 16 This emphasis on the freedom of the press was typical of Heinrich: his political ideals were the classic liberal constellation of freedom of expression, equality before the law, and a constitutional monarchy sharing power with a legislature elected by (at least) the propertied and educated classes. Marx, obviously, was more radical, and there is some evidence that Heinrich himself recognised this even before his son turned eighteen. 17 Nevertheless, as Richard Hunt has emphasised, Marx never abandoned his father's deepest political values: 'belief in the fundamental equality of man and in his perfectibility, in the progress of human institutions through history, in reason and science as the keys to the enigma of man's destiny, and in the ethical imperative to commit one's life to the betterment of mankind.' 18 These values were reinforced by Heinrich's neighbour Ludwig von Westphalen, a well-educated aristocrat who was Karl's mentor and later father-in-law. Born in 1770, von Westphalen had begun his career in the civil service in Brunswick, but transferred his allegiance to Napoleon (against the wishes of his family) after Prussia's defeat to France in 1806. He later transferred to Saxony and then to the Rhineland in 1816, where he was tasked with integrating the region into the Prussian governmental system. 19 Finally, if attitudes to the Revolution dominated the political landscape in Trier, Marx's sense of its centrality can only have only deepened when he went to university, first at Bonn and then, in autumn 1836, in Berlin. There, the intellectual battle of the day was between Eduard Gans, the liberal Hegelian around whom, as Jean Bruhat puts it, there had built up a 'real cult of revolutionary France,' and Karl von Savigny, the conservative leading exponent of the 'Historical School of Law'. 21 Marx attended both men's lecture courses in his first term, and in the former's focus on the development of reason in history, and the latter's on custom and tradition, he would have been perfectly able to discern the clash of responses to the great Revolution. 22 Marx, unsurprisingly, was particularly struck by Gans: his university leaving certificate described him as 'exceptionally diligent' in his course, and five years later, when von Savigny was brought into the Prussian cabinet, Marx launched an attack on the new minister and his teacher Gustav Hugo in along lines that Gans had initially made familiar. 23 In a world divided by attitudes to the Revolution, there is no doubt which side Marx was on.
ii.
Hence, there is evidence to suggest that support for the Revolution helped to shape Marx's political imagination from an early age. To the question of which aspects or moments of Revolutionary France he was most committed to--1789, 1792, 1793 or 1796, for example--it may first be observed that in such ideologically polarised times, aligning oneself with the Revolution at all, notwithstanding the memory of the Terror, was in itself a significant step.
That said, as Marx began to forge an independent life in his mid-twenties, the need to clarify his relation to the Revolution was evidently on his mind, as can be seen from the tasks to which he turned after completing his doctoral dissertation.
At twenty-four, Marx's commitment to a political life was already apparent. Certain that he would be unable to secure a university appointment owing to his connections with 'Die Freien,' the left-wing Hegelian group whose most senior figure, Bruno Bauer, had recently had his teaching license revoked on political grounds, Marx turned his ambitions in the only direction which remained open to him, joining the staff of the liberal newspaper Die Rheinische Zeitung in April 1842. In October he became its editor, and he remained at the paper until increasing censorship forced his resignation in March 1843. His staunch support for the Revolution was visible in the articles that he wrote during this time: he repeatedly attacked the worsening censorship, demanded full coverage of debates held in the provincial assemblies, criticised the reactionary romanticism that was at that time prevailing in the Prussian cabinet (epitomised by von Savigny's appointment), and allied himself openly with the Revolution in a defence of positive law. 24 Over half his articles were on the importance of freedom of the press--an issue obviously close to the heart of a newspaperman. Yet the Revolution and its legacy were even more present to his mind in the independent work that he produced the following spring. As soon as the opportunity arose, following the closure of the newspaper, Marx began an intensive study of the modern state, the 'genesis' of which he identified as the Revolution itself. 25 Marx's notebooks from the summer of 1843--when, newly married and living at his mother-in-law's house in Kreuznach, he was able to do whatever he pleased--provide valuable evidence of the depth and seriousness of his engagement with the Revolution. His research that summer fell into two categories, which he pursued simultaneously using at least five notebooks, indexed and titled for future use. First Here it is necessary to make an intervention in the historiography of Marx's thought on which it would be possible to dwell at some length, but which may be stated concisely. Marx as a strictly 'scientific' socialist, exclusively concerned with uncovering the iron laws of capitalist development in order to verify the inevitable victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, by pointing above all to Marx's Hegelianism, which is most prominent in these early writings. 28 Marx's production of a lengthy manuscript subjecting Hegel's Philosophy of Right to a painstaking line-by-line critique in the summer of 1843, in which he could be seen attacking Hegel's idealism (described as the 'inversion of subject and predicate') in favour of the approach that Engels later called 'historical materialism' (or turning Hegel 'right side up again,' as Marx put it in 1873), has thus been taken as a sign of Marx's abiding interest in Hegel, and of the profound significance for him of this particular philosophical terrain--that is, the conflict between idealism and materialism. 29 There is something to be said for this interpretation. Marx was indeed highly attuned to what he considered to be the folly of idealist approaches to history in a world that, as he saw it, was produced essentially by the 'material' activity of human beings. However, proponents of the standard view attach too little significance to the context in which Marx king Louis Philippe was declared to be established. What is interesting is that this analysis unfolds in the very terms of the inversion of subject and predicate that are more familiar to us today from Marx's critique of Hegel. The bald, un-mystified relation of the power of the agent to the thing achieved, or (in Marx's terms) the relation of subject to predicate, could easily be seen in the actions of the 'old monarchy,' Marx argued: there, 'the king made the law.' In the 'new monarchy,' however, the case was reversed. What had previously been the real subject, the possessor of agency (the king), was now presented as the predicate or thing achieved, while the former predicate (the constitutional charter) became the subject or apparent possessor of agency: after 1830, that is to say, 'the law made the king.' Marx wrote that this 'exchange of that which determines for that which is determined is always the most immediate revolution.' 33 That is, the general dynamic of revolution, whether progressive or reactionary, was in Marx's view always the same: to adopt the language he used in the letter to Ruge cited above, a revolution was precisely that moment when a thing that had previously seemed to be a 'dead object' rose up and pronounced itself to be a 'free human being.' 34 The difference between a progressive revolution and a reactionary one was simply that in a progressive revolution, the new agent, the free human being, really was a free human being, while in a reactionary revolution it was the free human being who was again made into a dead object.
It was because this dynamic really was manifest in modern political developments, Marx went on, that Hegel turned out to be an especially useful resource for understanding the modern state. 'Owing to the fact…that Hegel makes the elements of the state idea the subject, and the old forms of existence of the state the predicate,' Marx wrote, 'whereas in historical reality the reverse is the case, he expresses only the general character of the period, its political teleology.' 35 That is, because in Hegel's presentation it was the idea of the state that made demands on the real, historical state and brought the real, historical state into new modes of being, rather than ideas about the state that were brought into being by the experience of living in a real historical state (as Marx believed had to be the case), Hegel could be regarded as the perfect mouthpiece of the spirit of the age. In just the same way, then, that Marx thought that 'the King of Prussia will remain the man of his time so long as the topsy-turvy world is the real world,' and that 'this state, this society, produce religion, which is an inverted world-consciousness, because they are an inverted world,' he regarded Hegel's upside-down logic as, in the first instance, part and parcel of the real historical conditions that he was trying to understand. Marx's interest in the world in which Hegel's philosophy formed a part was thus not a side effect of his interest in Hegel. On the contrary, it was his interest in Hegel's world--his own world--that spurred his critique of Hegel's depiction of it.
Following this period of withdrawal into his study in Kreuznach, Marx and his wife moved to Paris ('the new capital of the new world!' he enthused to Ruge in September 1843). 36 Here, for the first time, he was able to acquaint himself personally with members of the French revolutionary tradition, seeking out men such as Louis Blanc and Etienne Cabet alongside a growing contingent of German democrats and communists in exile, and he embarked enthusiastically on the two projects between which he would divide his time for the next seven or eight years: the twin tasks of research and writing, and facilitating contact among republicans, democrats, Chartists, socialists and communists of many stripes in preparation for the revolutionary opportunity that he and Engels, his close collaborator after 1844, believed (rightly, as it turned out) to be on its way. 37 Neither Marx nor Engels saw any conflict between these two activities: as Marx put it, attempting 'the self-clarification (critical philosophy) of the struggles and wishes of the age' necessarily included 'lining our criticism with a criticism of politics…taking sides in politics…entering into real struggles and identifying ourselves with them.' 38 At the same time, his more intellectual interest in the Revolution did not diminish. For many months he planned to put his Kreuznach research to use in a history of the French National Convention. 39 The work never materialised, but several of Ruge's letters from the spring and summer of 1844 make a useful coda to this period of Marx's life, since they reveal the extent to which his historical, philosophical and political interests were intertwined. In May, Ruge wrote: 'Marx wants…to write a history of the Convention; to this effect he has accumulated the necessary documentation and he has arrived at some new and very fertile ideas. He has once again abandoned his critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right and wants to use his time in Paris to write this book on the Convention, which is exactly right.' In July: 'He was planning to write a treatise on politics, which is unfortunately not yet drafted. Then he wanted to write a history of the Convention, and read an enormous amount to that effect. Now he seems to have abandoned that project afresh'. Finally, and perhaps most revealingly, in August Ruge wrote:
19 37 Engels was so confident about the prospect of imminent regime change in England that in April 1848 he bet his brother-in-law twopence that his friend George Julian Harney, the Chartist leader and editor of The Northern Star, would be British Foreign Minister within two months! Hunt, Marxism and Totalitarian Democracy, pp. 141 and 178 n. 5. 38 Marx to Ruge, September 1843, MECW 3:142 39 20 September 1792-26 October 1795 Marx wanted to critique Hegel's idea of natural right from a communist point of view, then write a history of the Convention, and finally a critique of all the socialists. He always wants to write on whatever he has read last, but keeps on with his reading and making new extracts without stopping. I think it still possible that he may write a really great book, but too abstract, into which he will cram everything he has read. 40 If he had, of course, the task of analysing Marx's political commitments might be considerably easier. As it is, he wrote so little that was systematic that we must flesh out some of his basic assumptions ourselves. On several occasions during the 1840s, Marx had suggested that the political and social situation in Germany lagged embarrassingly far behind that of France in 1789, and that it would, at some point, be necessary to catch up. 41 In 1848 this appeared to be happening, and both men drew on the analogy of the French Revolution to illuminate events. Engels, for Communism itself was of a very rough and superficial kind, and because, on the other hand, the public mind was not yet far enough advanced."' In context, however, Engels's comment would seem rather more supportive than 'dismissive': '[Merely] political liberty is shamliberty, the worst possible slavery; the appearance of liberty, and therefore the reality of servitude. Political equality is the same…the contradiction hidden in it must come out; we must have either a regular slavery--that is, an undisguised despotism, or real liberty, and real equality--that is, Communism. Both these consequences were brought out in the French Revolution; Napoleon established the first, and Babeuf the second. I think I may be short upon the subject of Babeuvism, as the history of the conspiracy, by Buonarroti, has been translated into the English language' (MECW 3:393). On the mention of Babeuf in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Hunt makes much of the fact that Marx and Engels described the revolutionary literature that accompanied the movements of the proletariat during the French Revolution as having 'necessarily a reactionary character,' which 'inculcated universal asceticism and social levelling in its crudest form.' For what may be said against drawing from this comment the conclusion that Marx and Engels did not identify themselves with Babeuf's characteristic mix of democracy and communism, see below. Réforme for as long as they were in existence, this statement was evidently intended as a criticism, rather than a mere observation of the state of affairs. 63 Yet particularly with regard to Chartism (if only because it is better known today), the juxtaposition of these avowedly communist (or semi-communist) currents is likely to sound odd to modern ears. Historians have long debated the radicalism of the Chartist movement, but the Six Points elaborated in the Charter of 1838 (namely, suffrage for all men above twenty-one, voting by secret ballot, equal-sized electoral districts, an end to the property qualification required to stand for Parliament, pay for MPs, and annual elections) are likely to sound rather less radical than our preconceptions of allies of Marx and Engels might lead us to expect--especially since each of these demands, with the single exception of annual Parliaments, was actually met in the United Kingdom during the following century, with arguably no very radical results. Yet not only were Marx and Engels committed and vocal supporters of Chartism--Engels declaring in 1847 that he was 'proud to call himself a Chartist "name and all,"' and Marx, at the same meeting, reporting on behalf of the Democratic Committee of Brussels that 'The Democrats of Belgium felt that the Chartists of England were the real Democrats, and that the moment that they carried the six points of their Charter, the road to liberty would be opened to the whole world'--but the Chartist leaders George Julian Harney and Ernest Jones were also members of the Communist League from 1847. 64 The significant similarities that Marx and Engels, at least, evidently thought to obtain among these movements are thus a useful reminder both of the radical nature of demands for democracy in Europe the 1840s, and of the deep significance of the struggle for equal suffrage rights in the nineteenth-century communist tradition. 65 Marx and Engels were in fact quite explicit on this point: the English Chartists were more in keeping with the spirit of communism than men like Fourier or SaintSimon precisely because of their democratic commitments, and especially on account of the way that they epitomised proletarian self-help. 66 So too, and for the same reasons, was Babeuf; and an adequate grasp of Babeuf's ideas and the legacy of the democratic-communist convictions that he espoused--both of which were available to Marx and Engels in exactly the same form that they are to us today, in Buonarroti's 1828 book--is indispensable if we wish to understand some of the basic assumptions that went into the making of Marx's and Engels's most fundamental political commitments. After all, just as Marx and Engels had contrasted the Owenites and Fourierists with Babeuf and his followers at the outset of this section of the Manifesto, it is plausible to suppose that Babeuf and his followers would have joined them in support of Chartism and La Réforme. While Babeuf is today best known as 'the first revolutionary communist,' as his biographer R. B. Rose describes him, and while it was indeed his communist ideas to which
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Manifesto as 'universal asceticism and social levelling in its crudest form,' it was not, in fact, his communism for which he was principally known during the mid-nineteenth century. 67 As Rose reported, 'for at least a generation after the revolution, Babeuf's historical reputation was that of a martyr for democracy and not of a prophet of communism.' 68 ideals. Babeuf's chief desire throughout his career was to 'activate' the agency of the people, without whom 'nothing great can be done,' as he put it in the prospectus for his newspaper, Le Tribun du Peuple, in 1795. This had to begin with securing popular self-government; and the strategies he adopted in the service of this end were, pace Talmon and (following him) Hunt, far from smacking of totalitarianism. 70 The Conspiracy of the Equals was no 'vanguard party' but rather an organisation dedicated, in the first instance, to bringing down a government that, it was believed, had usurped the right of the people to be governed by a constitution of their own choosing. Far from working towards a 'minority revolution,' the conspirators believed that their supporters ran into the tens of thousands in Paris alone, and they tried to communicate with these individuals by word of mouth, placards and through the press at every possible opportunity. 71 They did suppose that a provisional dictatorship--closer to the Roman than the twentieth-century model--would be inevitable in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Directory, before the necessary elections could be organised, but it was expected to last no more than months or even days, and the conspirators' commitments to education for all and to the 'sacred right of a free press' were strong. 72 As for 'wholesale terror,' though one member of the conspiracy, Rossignol, may have anticipated the prospect of 'heads falling like hail' in retribution for the persecution suffered by democrats after Thermidor, the general expectation seems to have been that, after a couple of days of fighting in the streets (as seemed inevitable at every revolutionary juncture), 'tranquillity' would speedily be restored. 73 The principal point that must be made about the Conspiracy of the Equals is that it was, as Rose recognises, first and foremost an attempt to restore democracy in the shape of the Constitution of 1793, which had granted full rights of citizenship, including the right to vote, to every French man over the age of twenty-one. 74 That the establishment of the Constitution of 1793 was its immediate and chief goal is manifest in every piece of literature that the conspirators produced, both those for public and for more clandestine purposes: from their record of the creation of an insurrectional directory some time before March 30, 1796, to their first addresses to those members of the public whom they hoped would become its chief revolutionary agents, to the placards bearing the so-called 'Analyse de la doctrine de Babeuf' that were put up across Paris on the night of April 9, 1796, to garner support for the uprising then being planned. 75 Moreover, the Constitution of 1793 was the natural focal point for these friends of equality not merely because it had established universal adult male suffrage and was thus desirable in its own right, but also because--as Babeuf repeatedly pointed out in the pages of his newspaper and elsewhere--it had been ratified by 4,800,000 citizens voting in the primary assemblies, compared with the 900,000 who had approved of the Constitution of 1795 (which had re-imposed a property qualification on the franchise).
Thus, Babeuf argued (following Rousseau), the law of majoritarianism dictated that the earlier Constitution still stood, government by the Directory was illegitimate, and it was the duty of every virtuous citizen to act to reclaim the active sovereignty of the people. 76 The vigour with which he advocated the return of the 1793 Constitution was, in fact, the principal basis of his eventual execution; whereas others among the conspirators were also convicted of promoting it (the sole charge which the jury in the 1797 trial accepted against any of the accused, and one which had been a capital offence since 15 April 1796), 'extenuating circumstances,' mitigating against the death penalty, were deemed to apply in the majority of cases. In the cases of Babeuf and Darthe, no such circumstances were found. 77 Babeuf was thus no 'totalitarian democrat,' but rather a democrat tout court. While the conspiracy had not focused on communism, moreover, Babeuf was also certainly a communist: that is to say, he believed in the desirability of the establishment and administration of a system of communal property through political processes. 78 In Babeuf, democracy and communism could not be disentangled; and the assumption that these two aspirations, one overtly 'political,' the other more 'economic,' had a certain natural fit, continued to be a fundamental assumption of many of those on the left in the early part of the nineteenth century.
Although the leaders of the Conspiracy of the Equals directed their attention first and foremost to the establishment of the democratic Constitution of 1793, they did not suppose that once this constitution had been put in place, the reign of equality--which they characterised by the criteria of 'égalité, liberté et le bonheur commun' ('equality, liberty and the general happiness')--would automatically begin. On the contrary, Babeuf was quite clear 36 77 The Directory's decrees of 27 and 28 germinal, which introduced new penalties for forming public assemblies and posting illegal placards and made advocating the return of the Constitution of 1793 a capital offence, were really a testament to the efficacy of the conspirators in fomenting discontent with the Directorial regime--and remind us of the significantly repressive aspects of the government against which they were plotting. See further Rose, Babeuf, pp. 253, 325 78 Whether many of those involved in the conspiracy, aside from Buonarroti, could easily be identified as communists is hard to say. Jean-Baptiste Goulart, one of the accused, offered the following interpretation of the conspirators goals during their trial in 1797: 'a reduction in the price of all commodities necessary for the survival of the poor, and the recognition of paper money. ' Rose, Babeuf, p. 243 that, while the Constitution of 1793 'was a great practical step towards real equality,' it 'did not yet touch the end, nor was it fully competent to attain the general happiness.' 79 The 'bonheur commun' they expected to emerge gradually, over the months and years after the fall of the Directory and the establishment and dissolution of the provisional government which was to follow. As Buonarroti's book showed, the conspirators were anxious about the form that the provisional government should take, for all the reasons that any modern democrat would expect; and it is not certain that they ever reached a decision on this point before the conspiracy was smashed and its leaders arrested in May 1796. 80 But their long term hopes, at least, were reasonably clear. The 'general happiness' that they had in mind would require, they supposed, the direct public administration of most of the territory of the Republic, with a view to keeping a network of common storehouses equipped with the products of agriculture and other forms of production such that the basic needs of every citizen for food, shelter, clothing and medical aid might be met. 81 Babeuf's focus in his writings was very much on the need of all citizens to have access to land, simply so that they could eat: a reasonable enough perspective at a time when feudal agricultural arrangements were only just beginning to be dismantled, and food scarcity and low wages had led to widespread hunger among the urban poor. 'We claim--we demand--we will the communal enjoyment of the fruits of the earth, ' keep the wealthy one million well-fed, and advocated that legislation be used to require that every able-bodied person contribute to the common effort of production. 83 This may sound alarming; yet the specific forms of political control that Babeuf had in mind were at least profoundly democratic. The day-to-day business of the shared consumption and production of the community was to be run by 'local magistrates'--reminiscent of the archons of fifth-and fourth-century Athens--who would be, Babeuf wrote, 'freely chosen by its members, agreeably to the laws, and under the direction of the supreme administration.' 84 The supreme administration itself would be elected in accordance with the Constitution of 1793, which is to say, by universal adult male suffrage with representative institutions established at both the local and national levels. As Buonarroti reported, however, the Babeuvistes also wished to infuse as high a degree of direct democracy as possible into this representative framework, and thus expected to accord a large role to the use of mandates, referenda, the people's veto, and the power of initiative vested in the primary assemblies (which Babeuf identified with the Roman plebeians' right of provocatio). 85 Finally, it bears emphasising that no one was to be forced to join the planned economic community, although all French citizens were to enjoy identical political rights for an indefinite period. It was believed that as time went on and the advantages of a system of communal property became increasingly obvious, few would choose to remain outside the 'grand national community.' 'Old habits, old prejudices, will again seek to oppose obstacles to the establishment of the Republic of Equals,' Babeuf wrote. 'But what can avail a few thousand malcontents against such a mass of human beings, all happy, and astonished at having been so long in quest of a felicity which they had within hands' reach?' 86 Today, of course, these hopes may seem naive. But the point is that Babeuf and his colleagues simply assumed that the practice of democracy and the implementation of a system of communal production and distribution to meet the basic needs of all would go hand in hand. The crucial linking factor was universal suffrage; and in its absence, there was no reason to think that the majority, once they had the vote, would not vote to replace the current system of property over which they had no control and under which they suffered, for one that they would be able to run themselves and in which they would run no risk of starvation. is not to be assumed that others can judge better of its interests than the people itself can.' 89 He simply expected that the people, once they had secured their right to participate in selfgovernment, would want to use their political power to address the inequalities of a system in which a few individuals were able to amass wealth and power at the expense of others. This is not to say that Babeuf and Buonarroti did not anticipate resistance to such a scheme; of course they did not imagine that those holding power under the old system would be inclined to give it up without a fight. But, as Babeuf emphasised, these were one million, by his estimates, against twenty. The conspirators thus put their faith explicitly in the power of majoritarianism, and the natural desire of the people to act according to the 'lever' of their own interests. 90 The crux of Babeuf's ideas, and a vital part of the legacy of the Conspiracy of the part. The French Revolution, Engels wrote, had revealed that 'we must have either a regular slavery--that is, an undisguised despotism, or real liberty, and real equality--that is, Communism'; and while Napoleon had proven the first, Babeuf had proven the second.
Crucially, Babeuf's fame was at this point so great that Engels did not even feel that he had to dwell on him at any length. 'I think I may be short upon the subject of Babeuvism,' he wrote, 'as the history of the conspiracy, by Buonarroti, has been translated into the English language.' 93 More research remains to be done on the relationship between democracy and communism in the nineteenth century, and on the democratic bases of Marx's and Engels's democracy 'now have a social meaning in which the political meaning is dissolved.' What he meant by this was evidently something that we might call a distinction between constitutional questions and the kinds of social issues that we, today, have no difficulty in recognising as acutely political in their ramifications. The Revolution had been 'something quite different from a struggle for this or that form of the State,' which people in Germany still imagined it to be, he wrote. Indeed, 'The connection of most insurrections of that time with famine, the significance which the provisioning of the capital and the distribution of supplies assumed already from 1789 onwards, the maximum, the laws against buying up food supplies, the battle cry of the revolutionary armies…the testimony of Carmagnole according to which Republicans must have du pain as well as du fer and du Coeur--and a hundred other superficialities already prove…how greatly democracy differed at that time from a mere political organisation.' For Engels, then, modern democracy was not and should not be a 'mere' form of political organisation; rather, it should encompass social and economic issues as well.
Engels's next remarks brought out the significance of the Constitution of 1793 and Babeuviste traditions in this general scheme of things -essentially as the true representatives of the working people: 'As it is, it is well known that the Constitution of 1793 and the terror originated with that party which derived its support from the insurgent proletariat, that Robespierre's overthrow signified the victory of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat, that Babeuf's conspiracy for equality revealed the final consequences of the democracy of '93--insofar as these were at all possible at that time.' Concluding this thought and cementing the inclusion of the social within democracy as it was then being practised, Engels completed this paragraph as follows: 'The French Revolution was a social movement from beginning to end, and after it a purely political democracy became a complete absurdity. ' 96 Precisely what Engels meant by this was clarified in his next sentence, which is perhaps as cogent a testament to the fusion of democracy and communism as is to be found in the thought of Marx and Engels. 'Democracy nowadays is communism,' Engels stated.
'Democracy has become the proletarian principle, the principle of the masses.' Acknowledging the vagueness that some of these ideas had at a popular level, he continued, 'The masses may be more or less clear about this, the only correct meaning of democracy, but all have at least an obscure feeling that social equality of rights is implicit in democracy.' In fact, Engels went on, this meant that 'the democratic masses can safely be included in any calculation of the communist forces. And if the proletarian parties of the different nations unite they will be quite right to inscribe the word "Democracy" on their banners, since, except for those who do not count' (Engels was here referring to the aforementioned 'German theoreticians') 'all European democrats in 1846 are more or less Communists at heart.' Evidently, Engels shared with Babeuf the illusion that the restoration of the constitution of 1793 would inevitably lead to the endorsement of communism by the proletarian majority. But there is no suggestion here that democracy would be superseded. On the contrary, it was as much the necessary condition for communism as the adoption of communist principles appeared to be the inevitable consequence of its introduction. This was the tradition of democratic communism as it was forged in the French Revolution, and it is the tradition to which Marx and Engels belong.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to recontextualise the political thought of Marx and Engels by situating it in relation to the French Revolution, and specifically in the tradition of democratic communism represented during the Revolution by Gracchus Babeuf and his followers. I have argued that Marx and Engels identified themselves with this tradition, and assumed, like Babeuf before them, that a renewal of the Revolution's most democratic moment, as epitomised by the Constitution of 1793--which included universal suffrage, free and fair national and local elections, majoritarianism, a uniform civil and criminal code, and freedom of assembly, speech and of the press--would be a necessary precursor to, and continuing feature of, communism.
Marx and Engels' communism--like that of Babeuf before them--was democratic 'all the way down'. Their commitment to democracy was not a mere prelude to their communism (in either an analytical or chronological sense), nor did they conceive of communism as a more 'genuine' or 'truer' substitute for democratic political practices. They would have been baffled and surprised by the separation of communism from democracy in later accounts of their thought (including the use of the term 'conversion' to describe their embrace of communism), just as surely as they were baffled and frustrated by the dawning realisation, towards the end of their lives, that the natural 'twin'--at least in this period of human history--of the kind of liberal representative democratic measures that they supported might, in fact, be a regime of private property in the form of capitalism, rather than the public administration of communal property which was the hallmark of communism. Yet not until some time after the period with which this paper is concerned did the gradual unfolding of communism twinned with democracy cease to seem the most likely political development.
The surprise for these mid-nineteenth century communists (and democrats and Chartists) was that universal suffrage, when it finally came, did not result in the move towards full citizen control of the social bases of production (though we should not forget that many features of the approach to that condition most cherished by Marx and Engels, such as a graduated income tax, politically imposed limits on inheritance, and state-funded universal education, did indeed come to pass). To comprehend fully the thought of these nineteenth-century political activists, we must perhaps learn to feel the shock of the fact that before the twentieth century was out, it was capitalism that had come to be perceived as the natural ally of the democratic political process, rather than the communism of many of the nineteenth-century men and women who worked so hard to achieve democracy.
